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A Series of Political Russian Events to Exploit and Destroy the Volga Germans,
1914-1921

Kassidy Whetstone
HIST 451-1001
Dr. Tusan
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Immigration, although at times it may seem like a modern issue, has been
controversial for hundreds of years. A major facet surrounding the issue of immigration is
how well the new immigrants are able to adapt to the culture of their new country.
Despite hopeful initial intentions, immigration is not always a successful endeavor;
policies (and policy failures) on behalf of the hosting country as well as inflexible
demands of immigrants may lead to civil discord between the two parties. This was
precisely the case for the Volga Germans living in the Russian Saratov region, which was
unfortunately the case of an immigration experiment gone wrong. Although there has
been much debate over what exactly led to the perceived failure of the Russian
immigration experiment, it has been agreed upon that the experiment ultimately was a
failure, as it turned violent and has been investigated as a possible instance of ethnic
cleansing and genocide.
For this project, I will be investigating the Volga Germans living in the Russian
Saratov region, and analyzing the relationship between the Germans and their Russian
neighbors in the early 20th Century. This paper will use primary sources including journal
and diary entries from individuals either living in the Volga region or visiting for relief
purposes, letters sent from Volga Germans, newspaper articles describing major events
occurring within the Volga region, as well as maps and photographs from the time. This
paper will also include secondary sources from various historians and scholars who have
investigated the Volga Germans and the catastrophes surrounding them, with works in
the forms of books, journal articles, speeches, and maps. These resources have been
obtained through the databases of WorldCat, JSTOR and Historical Abstracts, or through
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university library resources including the physical book stacks, online resources,
interlibrary loan, and microfilm.
This paper will seek to answer the following question: What event, or series of
events, served as the breaking point in the relationship between the Volga Germans and
the Russians, leading the failure of the immigration experiment? In 1762, when Catherine
II drafted the proclamation that would invite foreigners into Russian territory to revive
the agricultural economy, she expressed hopeful intentions. If the Russian government
was hopeful in bringing Germans into Russia, and the Germans were hopeful in starting
new lives in Russia, what went wrong? This paper is driven by the thesis that a series of
events, consisting of World War I, the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the 1921 Russian
Famine together led to the deterioration and ultimate demise of the relationship between
the Volga Germans and their Russian counterparts, thus rendering Catherine’s initial
immigration experiment a failure. While the First World War and the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution generated much tension between the Volga Germans and Russians and
weakened the autonomous German society, it was the Famine of 1921 that delivered the
final blow to the suffering Volga Germans and virtually incapacitated them. This paper
will seek to understand the depth of Germanophobia throughout Russia, to analyze the
consequences of anti-German campaigns on future Volga German affairs, and to
understand why Catherine’s immigration experiment, which may be the largest in
Russian history, ultimately failed.
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Historiography:
Historians agree that the years from 1914-1921 were a tumultuous time for the
Volga Germans and their Russian neighbors due to a series of events that generated
tension between the two parties. The first trial in this series was the First World War, in
which Germany and Russia were engaged in combat against each other. In 1914,
Germanophobia began to spread throughout Russia, as the Russians feared that the
villagers were aiding the German enemy at the onset of World War I. According to
Colorado State University history professor James Long, media and newspaper
campaigns were launched as “The Volga Germans were invariably described as the
lowest form of humanity, debauched, devious, dishonest, and deceitful, whose only
purpose in coming to Russia had been to exploit the Russian land and people.”1 Army
instructor and historical society officer George J. Walters also recognized 1914 as the
“beginning of the end” of the Volga Germans, as it marked the last 25 years of the Volga
Germans’ existence in Russia. With such hostile Germanophobia, Walters argues that
“everything German became suspect within the Russian Empire” and that the Volga
Germans became known as the “enemy within.” This led to severe hateful actions taken
against the Volga Germans, including attempts at ethnic cleansing, which will be
discussed in more detail in the following pages. Although Walters attributes the entire
period from 1914-1922 as being detrimental to the villagers as acts of “war, famine,
murders, and exile” led to their eventual annihilation, the year 1914 was vital in marking
the beginning of the end for the Volga Germans.2
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With 1914 and the onset of World War I being the first event which damaged the
relationship between the Volga Germans and the Russians, the second event to provide
additional damage was the 1917 Russian Revolution. As the Bolsheviks were rising to
power, the Volga Germans were known for running successful farms, despite the antiGerman campaigns that were attempting to weaken them. Because the German farms
were so successful compared to the Russian peasants and that the Volga German society
was still autonomous, Katarzyna Maniewska argues that they were “dangerous to the
newly-arising Bolshevik state.” The Bolsheviks needed a way to control the Germans
without linking the Bolshevik state to Germany, which resulted in what Maniewska calls
“war communism” as the Russian army initiated requisitions of German resources.3
Walters argues that the Bolshevik Revolution turned the German villages into
battlefields, as the Russian army ransacked villages and murdered villagers who did not
fully comply, devastating the villages. Walters argues that this devastated the villages
more than the army acknowledged, as the villages’ production of agriculture plummeted
due to the farmers being afraid to work in the fields alone.4
Historical society member and Volga-German born Fred Koch argues that the
Bolsheviks not only suppressed the Volga Germans economically in terms of agriculture,
but also socially and culturally in terms of religion. Koch argues that various forms
religion, including both Protestant and Catholic, comprised a major portion of the Volga
German identity, which posed a threat to the secular state. When the Bolsheviks removed
religion from the German schools and imprisoned and even murdered church leaders, it
was another violent attempt through the revolution to suppress German culture and
3
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identity among the Volga villages.5 By 1919, historian Robert Conquest argues that the
Bolsheviks had lost all cordiality with the Volga Germans, and initiated what he calls the
“Peasant Wars,” in which the German villagers took up arms and retaliated against the
Russian army. 6 Orlando Figes, a British professor of history at the University of London,
also argues that the conflict was directly aimed at the requisitioning brigades. Figes
describes instances of revolt in which “the villagers attacked the brigade with pitchforks,
axes, and pikes, disarmed it, and chased it out of the village.” More than 150,000 Volga
Germans participated in these conflicts, and took up arms directly against the
requisitioning squads. The result of these uprisings was devastating, however, as the
Russian army ultimately won the battle and instilled harsh consequences among the rebel
villagers, often in the form of even harsher requisitions.7 These requisitions worsened the
famine state that had already begun developing among the Volga region, and the Volga
German state was so incredibly weakened by this combination of violence and starvation,
that it would not be able to recover in a timely manner.
Unfortunately, the Volga Germans were never able to recover before the third
major event: the 1921 Russian famine. Conquest argues that the famine was largely
caused by political influence, because of the destruction caused by the Russian army’s
violent and devastating requisition of Volga German resources. Conquest argues that the
requisitioning had two effects on the German farms: 1) the villages were stripped of
resources to produce more crops, and 2) the villagers were left with little incentive or
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motivation to farm again.8 Maniewska also argues that the famine was a result of the
severe Bolshevik requisitions.
Although the famine was devastating throughout Russia, it was especially severe
for the Volga Germans because they were still being targeted for their food supplies.
Maniewska argues that because the Russians were envious of the German success in
agriculture, German villages were the first to be targeted and forced to supply grains
throughout the rest of Russia. Maniewska argues that the Volga Germans already had
scarce resources to begin with, but this made the situation even worse.9 Samuel Sinner
also attributes political causes to the severe devastation of the Volga Germans during the
famine, as Lenin issued even harsher requisitions of Volga German goods in 1921. Sinner
argues that over 300,000 Volga Germans “needlessly died” as a result of these
requisitions because the Germans were supplying more resources than they were keeping
for themselves.10
Hundreds of thousands of Volga Germans succumbed to the famine, and Walters
argues that the damage was so severe that they would never be able to recover. The
United States and England were major relief sponsors during the famine, although their
relief still only reached a fraction of those in need. While the relief efforts did save
millions of individuals from starving to death, it did not restore the strength needed for
the Volga Germans to be as prosperous as they once were, at least compared to their
peasant Russian counterparts. The famine completely devastated the Volga Germans
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beyond any sort of recovery, so that they were totally defenseless against Stalin’s future
extermination efforts, and their only options were to leave Russia or be executed.11
For my research, I will be using the previously mentioned historians and scholars
to analyze World War I, the 1917 Revolution, and the 1921 Famine as the core events
that fed the (eventually successful) Germanophobic efforts to drive the Volga Germans
out of Russia. As Maniewska states, much attention has been given to the 1921 Famine,
yet very little has been given to the Volga German experience surrounding these events.12
Based on the arguments from the previously mentioned historians and scholars as well as
research from other sources, this paper will aim to serve as a response to the complaints
of historians, and generate an analysis of the Volga German experience surrounding the
events from 1914-1921. In order to understand these events, a brief background of the
Volga Germans is crucial.

Background:
After the Seven Years’ War in the 18th Century, the German states within the
Holy Roman Empire were plagued with unemployment, poverty, religious persecution
and tense social-class relationships. Life for peasants was miserable, as members of the
elite classes abused their standings and often times forcibly sent commoners to foreign
lands as mercenaries. On July 22, 1763, Russian tsarina Catherine II issued a
proclamation inviting foreigners into Russia to serve as buffer populations on the outer
region, and it appeared to the German peasants as a promising opportunity. To make the
invitation even more appealing, foreigners were promised religious freedom, tax
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exemption, and guaranteed suitable land. These were features that had been absent from
peasant life in Germany, and naturally a large amount of German peasants from all walks
of life answered the call, primarily relocating along the Volga River.13 While immigrants
from several different countries traveled to Russia, Germans comprised the majority, and
settled in the Saratov Province on the Northern portion of the Volga River [Fig. 1].14
The Germans who accepted Catherine’s invitation faced many tribulations in
traveling to Russia, as many German states were forced to prohibit the emigration due to
a drop in the population of peasants remaining in Germany. In addition, Russia was
overwhelmed by the response, and ships bore unsanitary conditions due to overcrowding.
To the peasants, however, these were minor obstacles that they could overcome because
they believed that the life in Russia would be worth the struggle. Upon arrival to the
Volga region, however, it was immediately apparent that the Russian government had not
fulfilled all of their promises. Many Germans arrived to infertile and dry grasslands that
were not suitable for farming. This would prove to be difficult for many Germans, as
farming was the primary occupation of the peasants. However, they found solutions to
these issues by traveling to farther lands that were suitable, or pursuing different
occupations.15
For the most part, the newly named Volga Germans were willing to overlook
these broken promises, largely because they could freely practice religion. Religion was
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incredibly important to the Volga German culture, as it was often implemented into
regular school programs, and allowed the villagers to retain their German identity.
During the first several decades of the Volga Germans living within Russia, the
villagers were able to adapt to their new lifestyles and develop successful village
communities. Churches were the staple of communal life, and the newly developed
schools provided education superior to that within the Holy Roman Empire, and even
surpassing the quality of many Russian schools. Russian peasants began to resent how
successful the schools were becoming, and often denounced the lifestyles of the Volga
Germans; the Russians viewed the Germans as too strict and stubborn, while the Germans
viewed the Russians as lazy and unorganized. Because of these cultural differences
between the two groups, they typically avoided each other and stayed within their own
communal groups.16 While at the time this seemed to be the solution to avoid conflict, it
only brewed resentment between the two parties.
In 1871, under the reign of Alexander II, the promises made by Catherine had
been revoked and the Volga Germans were subjected to what later became interpreted as
“Russification.” The German language was banned from schools, German teachers were
replaced with Russian teachers, and Volga Germans were forced to convert to the
Russian Orthodox religion. By 1881, all of Catherine’s policies had been reversed and the
Volga Germans became the equivalent of Russian peasants, also subject to military
service and tax payments.17
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It must be noted, however, that at this point the Volga Germans were still viewed
as an autonomous people, living in the Autonomous Republic of Volga Germans. The
villages were allowed to host local government systems, as long as they would still
adhere to the national Russian order. In the 1860s, the Russian government installed
zemstvos as a branch of government to place Russians alongside the Volga German
officials. This was not received well, however, and was viewed as another component of
Russification. Despite the animosity toward these systems, the zemstvos remained in
operation for several decades.
By 1897, it was reported that the population of the Volga Germans had reached
1.8 million, and was continuing to grow. The Russians feared these growing numbers,
and continued to enforce Russification in order to gain some form of control over the
incredibly large state.18 From the 1860s until the early 1900s, animosity toward
Russification continued to brew among the Volga German villages, especially when
changes were made in land distribution among the peasant class, placing the Volga
Germans at a disadvantage. The main act of Russification that the Volga Germans would
not tolerate, however, was the secularization of German Kirchenschulen (church schools)
under the branch of the Ministry of Education in the 1890s. The Russian government had
previously released decrees stating that religion would no longer be practiced in the
Volga German schools, although no official actions had been taken towards it. When the
zemstvo system, which linked local Volga German governments to the national Russian
government, allowed this to happen, the Volga Germans rejected the zemstvos. A
revolution occurred among the villages in 1905 in an attempt to overthrow the zemstvo
system and revive German culture and autonomy, although it was not successful in
18
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initiating any major policy change.19 Although the revolution did not bring any long-term
changes, it was significant in showing that there was growing tension in the relationship
between the two parties, and that there was disagreement over economics, culture, and
government.
Although the tension was growing stronger as years progressed, there was rarely
violence between the Volga Germans and their Russian neighbors. Eventually, however,
the tension would boil over and the relationship between the two parties would begin to
crumble in 1914, with the onset of World War I.

World War I: The Onset of Germanophobia
1914 and the First World War proved to be not only a difficult time for the
Russians as they were at war with Germany, but for the Volga Germans as well. At the
onset of World War I, the Russian military issued drafts to all male citizens, regardless of
national origin. In a 1915 letter by an unnamed Volga German villager, it was stated that,
“on the 19th of next month [March], nineteen-year-old boys will be drafted. They exempt
nobody from the military service.” At the same time, however, the Russian sentiment
toward the Volga Germans was becoming more visible, as the nation was at war with the
Volga Germans’ country of origin. In the same letter, the villager captured Volga German
fears of what the future would hold when they continued, “Today…speeches were made
against citizens of German origin. They want to exile us.”20 Volga Germans began living
in fear, as they were uncertain of what the Russians would do with them. Many of them

19

Long, From Privileged to Predisposed, 195, 213-214.
Author Unknown to Pauline Lehl, February 2, 1915, in Letters to Pauline ed. Pauline Lehl, Journal of
the American Historical Society of Germans From Russia 8, no. 4 (1985): 29.

20

12
were drafted into the Russian army, and had to fight against their home country of
Germany. Many Volga Germans willingly volunteered to serve in the Russian army, as a
service to the country that they now lived in. Others stayed in the villages and dealt with
the daily harassment and discrimination from the Russians. The Russians feared that the
Volga Germans were acting as spies and supplying their harvested grain to the German
military. The finishing touch was the fear that the Volga Germans had strategically been
placed within the Russian borders by German military forces to exploit the nation from
within its borders. Once these paranoid ideas began to spread throughout Russia,
Germanophobia surfaced in what James Long refers to as an anti-German “witch-hunt.”
Newspaper campaigns were launched that depicted the Volga Germans as
barbarous traitors who were exploiting Russia’s resources and destroying the country
from within. The Germans were viewed as a “yoke,” and many Russians believed that the
Germans must be cast out of “Mother Russia.” In 1914 the Russian Council of Ministers
banned the German language in schools, and made Russian the only acceptable language.
By 1915, the German “unorthodox” religions were removed from education, and the
Kirchenschule (church schools) were shut down. At the same time that this was
happening, the “Society of 1914” an anti-German political group, began spreading
rumors that the Volga Germans were a greater threat than any national military could
ever pose, and that the Volga Germans were conspiring an economic takeover from
within. In addition, the Fundamental Laws of February 1915, also known as the
Liquidation Laws, called for the expropriation of German villagers and the transfer of
their land to Russian peasants. Many Volga Germans sold their lands before the
government could get to them, which made it more difficult for them to be located and
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deported. As a result of the Volga Germans remaining ahead of the laws, the
Fundamental Laws were not enforced for very long. Nonetheless, there was an active
threat against the Volga Germans, who had been living in Russia for over 150 years by
the start of World War I. However, because they were of German origin, and because of
the tension between the Volga Germans and Russians that had been brewing up to this
point, World War I allowed for official discrimination and Germanophobia toward the
Volga Germans. This Germanophobia began to take a violent turn, and became so
extreme that even Russian citizens with German ancestry were persecuted.21
The anti-German campaigns during World War I became so severe, that Samuel
Sinner estimates that there were around 100,000 Volga German casualties from the
Fundamental Laws alone, since the expropriations often turned violent. Sinner argues that
this fact has received very little attention, though, since Russia classified it as an
emergency wartime action.22
For many of the Volga Germans, there was uncertainty as to what should be done
in response to these discriminatory acts from their Russian neighbors. They could
emigrate out of Russia, as some did, but where would they go? Germany was at war, so
returning back to their homeland was not a feasible option. Many Volga Germans
decided to stay in Russia, and hope that the current situation would subside and that they
would be able to resume to their normal lives once again.
Unfortunately, the Volga Germans who stayed were wrong; World War I was just
the beginning of mass-scale destruction to the villagers and the breakdown of the Volga
German-Russian relationship, and they had already been alienated from the rest of
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Russian society. Russian animosity toward the Germans had finally boiled over, and
chaos would ensue in the following years. For a short period of time, the Volga German
situation began to look up around the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution, as the
revolution diverged much attention away from the villagers and the witch-hunts against
them. However, as will be argued in the following pages, the early hopeful events of the
1917 Revolution were short lived, as the Volga Germans were once again relentlessly
targeted as the enemies within.

Revolution and Internal Threats
In 1917, the Russian Revolution was initiated in a series of political efforts to end
imperial rule in Russia and implement a new, Communist government that would bring
power to the peasant class. These events were monumental for Russia, and incredibly
controversial. Two primary parties leading the revolution were the Bolshevik Party by
Vladimir Lenin, and a moderate-liberal party led by Alexander Kerensky. During this
time, life began to improve for the peasant Volga Germans. While they were still subject
to discrimination and witch-hunts, the political upheaval helped relieve some of the
attention that the Volga Germans had been receiving, and the violence against them had
dramatically reduced. The moderate party led by Kerensky, which for some time was at
the forefront of the revolution, sought to emphasize human rights and restored religious
equality throughout Russia, and achieved some success in doing so. By February 1917,
the Volga Germans revived their culture and believed that peace had finally arrived. In
April of 1917, a Volga German villager by the name of Amalia wrote a letter to her sister
in the United States. In the letter, she demonstrates the change in attitude toward the
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villagers with the start of the revolution. Social events had been organized, to which
members of all nationalities and ethnic origins were welcome to attend. Upon attending
an event alongside Armenians and Georgians, Amalia reflected, “it was so merry that I
just wanted to say something pleasant to everybody. And all the people became so polite,
as if they were quite different people.”23 Russian society seemed to have completely
abandoned its recent anti-German ideals, and the Volga Germans thought that this would
start a new peaceful era. However, they did not realize that life had been peaceful under
the moderate Kerensky’s party, which was not pushing the Germanophobic agenda. By
the end of the year, the Bolsheviks defeated Kerensky’s moderate party, and to Vladimir
Lenin and the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, the Volga Germans were a threat.
By the time that the Bolshevik party was rising to power at the end of 1917,
Russia was still at war with Germany. The Bolshevik leaders still believed that the Volga
Germans were loyal to Germany, and that they were an internal enemy. There was debate
over how to handle the Volga Germans due to Russia’s critical state with Germany; to
fully accept the autonomous Volga German state would link Russian ideals with German,
but to completely unleash on them could be considered an act of violence toward the
German state. As a result, the Bolshevik party turned their narrative against the entire
peasant class.
Two major actions by the Russian government led to Volga German revolt, as the
two actions respectively attacked two core Volga German ideals. First, in January 1918,
the Bolsheviks separated church from state. This was a continuation of Kerensky’s 1917
freedom of religion, since it removed government policy from the practice of religion,
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except the Bolsheviks intended to slowly rid of religion entirely. Church leaders were
targeted and arrested for promoting in “counterrevolutionary propaganda,” and thousands
of religious leaders were tortured and executed. To the Volga Germans, this was a direct
attack on their way of living, as religion was a staple of communal life. It was so
important, that Koch referred to it as the “center of the colonists’ intellectual world.”24
This second removal of religion from societal life was a repeat of the Codex of 1871 and
secularization of Kirchenschulen from the Ministry of Education, as well as the 1915
attempt to ban the German “unorthodox” religions. This was all too familiar to the Volga
Germans, but there was still another lingering element of the Bolshevik’s attacks on
them.
The Bolsheviks decided that they could no longer ally with the peasant class, and
in May 1918 the Commissariat of Food called for “excess grain” to be taken from
farmers. The Bolshevik party was still trying to decide how they would control the Volga
Germans, and at this point, the villagers’ farms were known for their success compared to
other Russian peasants. By passing laws directed to the peasant class as a whole, the
Russian government could specifically target the Volga Germans. The villagers knew
this, and reduced the amounts of their farmland and production in an attempt to make
themselves less noticeable and fall below having any sort of “excess” measurements.
This did not help them, though, as the Bolsheviks were determined to drive the Volga
Germans out of Russia. These intentions were noticed throughout the world, and began to
concern various nations. In 1918, the New York Times posted an article in which it was
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noted that the Russian “masses are becoming more definitely anti-German,” and that it
was largely an issue of social class.25
By 1919, Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik party passed even harsher requisition
laws, making German fields subject to random attacks. And for the first time, the Volga
Germans decided that they would take up arms to retaliate against this exploitation. This
retaliation started what Robert Conquest describes as the “Peasant Wars,” in which
peasants of all ethnic backgrounds joined the Volga Germans and fought to defend
themselves against the Red Army’s requisitions. An example of this would be the
Antonov Rebellion, which originated in the Tambov Province, next to the German
Saratov Province. In a short time, the rebellion had reached the Saratov region as well as
surrounding provinces, and a militia of 40,000 peasants was formed.26 These conflicts
turned the Volga villages into battlefields, as the Bolsheviks requisition became brutal
and violent.
The requisitioning squads incited fear in the villagers, as their attacks were
unpredictable and gruesome. Vladimir Lenin understood the severity and brutality with
which his forces ransacked the villages, as he stated in a quote, “we took all the surplus
grain-and sometimes even not only surplus grain but part of the grain the peasant required
for food.”27 These requisitions had detrimental effects on the Volga Germans for various
reasons, as the majority of the fighting took place within the villages. Agricultural
production of the villages dropped dramatically; first by the villagers’ own hand, but later
at the hand of the Red Army. Much of the villagers’ resources had been destroyed or
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ceased, so there was little left for the villagers to harvest. In addition, the villagers were
left with little motivation to continue farming, as they were often scared to enter the fields
alone in the event of another Bolshevik raid. This would lead to a small-scale famine in
1920 among the villages, which would ultimately spread and affect other regions of
Russia.
Germany was aware of the situation unfolding with their subjects in Russia, and it
could be argued that the Volga German experience inspired anti-Bolshevism propaganda.
An example of this is a 1919 poster from Berlin [Fig. 2]. In German, it headlines “Not,
Elend, Hunger, Zerstörung bringt der Bolschewismus”, which I translated literally to
“Need, Misery, Hunger, Suffering, brings the Bolshevism”. The poster depicts a German
family, huddled together and watching in distress as mounted Bolshevik troops raid and
torch their cabin, leaving with their livestock.28 The poster bears such strong resemblance
to the experiences of the Volga Germans, that it can be argued that this was Germany’s
response to the Russian treatment of their subjects.
If this was indeed Germany’s form of response, it was ineffective, as the
Bolsheviks continued to target and exploit the Volga Germans. Many villagers left Russia
and went all throughout the world, while others remained within the Saratov region
hoping for better days. Yet again, a third wave of destruction was quickly approaching, as
the miniature famine that the Volga Germans were facing in 1920 was a precursor to a
much larger and more destructive famine. At this point in time, the Volga Germans had
survived six years of witch-hunts, violent xenophobia, and oppression. The Volga
Germans had been weakened by the past few years, but not yet destroyed as the Russians’
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had hoped. The anti-German campaigns during the First World War and the Bolshevik
Revolution were part of a larger political mission to achieve an ethnic cleansing of
Russia; so far, it had been unsuccessful and the Volga Germans were still steadily
clinging to their way of life. However, the next event, the Famine of 1921, would render
them so weak and defenseless beyond any sort of recovery, leaving them vulnerable to
whatever events would transpire in future years.

The Famine of 1921: The Last Straw
The Famine of 1921 was the final event that aided in the weakening of the Volga
Germans, before the reign of Joseph Stalin decimated them over the course of the next
decade. In 1920 the Volga Germans faced a small-scale famine due to the harsh
requisitions of their harvests by Russian soldiers, although it was dismal in comparison to
the large-scale famine that would kill millions of men, women and children throughout
Russia. The Famine of 1921 is important to analyze when investigating the treatment of
the Volga Germans, as the power of the famine was largely motivated and fueled by
political influence of the newly-formed Bolshevik government.
In 1921, the English Save the Children Fund generated a map to display the
various levels of devastation throughout Russia in an attempt to conclude where aid
should be delivered [Fig. 3]. According to this map, the Saratov Province housing the
Volga Germans was the most heavily affected, with the darker color signifying more
devastation.29 The United States also conducted a relief effort, and it was reported that
because of the gruesome conditions in the Volga regions, many relief workers were
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reported to have emotional breakdowns upon arrival.30 Although the famine brought
destruction all throughout Russia, what makes the Volga Germans unique in this event is
that the famine was largely a continuation of the anti-German sentiment in the region,
and that the Volga Germans were targeted extensively for their resources.
The Bolshevik requisitions of Russian goods was detrimental to the Volga
Germans, and caused so much destruction that the villagers had little resources for
harvest in the spring of 1921. Despite them not having resources, Vladimir Lenin
continued to demand that the Volga Germans provided food, livestock and other
resources to the rest of Russia. In 1914 the Volga Germans collectively possessed around
1.2 million cattle; however, there were only around 200,000 by 1921.31 Despite these
statistics, Lenin continued to raise the requirements placed upon the Volga Germans, and
villagers who could not meet the demands would be imprisoned, turned into servants, or
sometimes killed.32 The villagers could not meet these demands, and the Bolshevik army
continued to raid the villages and take whatever resources were available. The raids were
brutal, as troops would arrive unannounced, storm houses and barns, steal whatever
resources could be found, and then torch the dwellings before leaving. Among the Volga
Germans, the requisition squads became known as the “Iron Broom.” As a Volga German
pastor noted in 1921,
“The gang was known as the ‘Iron Broom.’ And it was a fit and proper
name. For like roaring lions they came to the settlements, and any order on
produce that had not been collected in full, was forcibly collected afresh.
All houses, barns, stables, cellars, lofts, were searched, and literally swept
of everything they contained, down to the last dried apple, and the last egg.
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These Tula33 labor gangs caused such a terror and such a panic in the
settlements that many women swooned when a gang was approaching. No
prayers, no supplications would help. And woe to the farmer in whose
possession flour or any other produce was found; he was tortured and
whipped to the blood. Some of the settlers who had thus been tortured
succumbed to their wounds: such was the case with two men in the
settlement Blumenfeld.”34
Because the Volga Germans were not only suffering during the famine, but also
being targeted in a series of xenophobic witch-hunts, they became the favorites of the
relief workers sent to the Russian region. It is important to note that the devastation was
felt all throughout Russia, and it cannot be ignored that Russian peasants were oppressed
as well. However, the large scale of devastation felt by the Volga Germans is important
to study due to it being caused by such heavy political motivation. The requisitions
allowed the Russian government to oppress the Volga Germans in ways that the previous
Germanophobic campaigns never could. While the requisitions were directed to the
general peasant class, there was resentment against the Volga Germans due to their
successful farms. Unreasonable demands were placed upon the farmers, and they could
not feed their families due to their obligation to feed the rest of Russia. This led to
disgusting conditions, once again while throughout Russia, particularly in the Volga
German villages, the villagers were forced to eat pets such as cats and dogs, and
occasionally each other. In a 1922 letter sent to Pauline Lehl, Volga villager Amalia
describes the horror in the villages. Individuals were arrested after they “killed people
and sold them roasted or cold at the market. Mostly they kill children…there are
persistent rumors circulating about the loss of several children, mostly orphanage

33

Tula is a city just Northwest of Saratov.
Unknown author, “Memorandum of N.N.,” American Relief Administration, Russian Operations, Box 99,
(November 10, 1921): 4. As quoted in James Long, From Privileged to Predisposed, 514.

34

22
children.”35 Adults and children alike were afraid to travel alone, as reports were
circulating of individuals being abducted, butchered, and sold. And while many arrests
were made on those who were caught, these problems were running rampant throughout
the Russian region as the entire region was entering a chaotic state of emergency.
Both English and American relief workers set up food kitchens, and their efforts
hundreds of thousands of lives throughout Russia [Fig. 4].36 Sir Benjamin Robertson
from the English Save the Children Fund visited some of these kitchens and refugee
camps in the Saratov Province, and made a journal of his observations. In the journal, he
notes that the conditions of the refugees are “indescribably bad,” and that there was an
average of two-dozen deaths daily during his visit.37 There was also controversy in the
winter of 1921 when heavy snow and ice prohibited relief teams from reaching the
villages. Instead of travelling by sled, as many teams from England and the United States
had done, many troops of the Russian army instead kept the resources for themselves and
neglected to deliver them. This was a large controversy, as newspapers throughout the
world questioned this as another component in the attempt to rid Russia of the Volga
Germans.38 Although the strategy may not have been to kill them off by starving them,
the strategy, based on analysis of previous attempts from prior years, could have been to
starve them enough to motivate their emigration.
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Relief workers from the United States and Britain showed suspicion toward the
Russians, as they felt that the Russians could not be trusted to deliver the needed
resources. In January of 1922, Dr. Cornick had been stationed in the Saratov Province to
assist with general relief efforts and to tend to the ill. In a letter to his sister, Dr. Cornick
stated that, “I don’t believe I have ever had such a profound contempt…as I have for the
Russians…I really believe that their intentions are good, but they can’t follow simple
instructions to save their lives, and can’t count ten bottles on a shelf and get the same
result three times straight along.”39
Over the course of the famine, the German suitable land decreased in some areas
by more than 60%, leading to 95% of the population to be starving. A combination of the
requisitions and of eating any available food resulted in the disappearance of more than
half of the villages’ horses alone. Many families did not own horses, or ate the ones they
did, despite owing them to the Russian army. In the course of two years, from 1920-1922,
more than 100,000 people died in the Volga German villages from starvation alone, with
thousands more dying at the hands of Russian soldiers for not surrendering the demanded
resources. More than 250,000 of approximately 370,000 Volga German families were
starving, but while Germany was aware of the situation of its subjects, the country was
facing its own consequences from the First World War and was not in a position to be
able to provide much assistance. The only thing that kept the Volga Germans alive was
the combined effort of England and the United States in the form of relief projects.40
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The American and English relief projects were what saved the Volga Germans
from complete extinction during this period, as it was estimated that the efforts were what
stopped the Volga German population from starving entirely. While the projects were
vital in keeping the Volga Germans alive, they could not revive their communities. These
projects are credited with keeping the Volga Germans in a stable condition until the
famine would eventually ease by 1923. Because of the heavy population losses incurred
over the course of the famine, which in some regions amounted to nearly all of the
villagers, the Volga Germans would never be able to gain the strength back which was
needed to run successful farms as they once did. And of the villagers who did survive the
famine, many of them emigrated out of Russia as soon as they were healthy enough to do
so.

Conclusion:
For years, the Volga Germans were the leading supplier of grain resources to the
rest of Russia, and for years, the Volga Germans were one of the most oppressed groups
within the Russian region. The case of the Volga Germans is the case of an immigration
experiment gone wrong, the case of immigrants and a country’s natives living
uncomfortably together. In 1763, Catherine II had the right intentions when she invited
Germans into Russia, and hoped that prosperity would come to both parties. However, a
series of corrupt leaders led to the exploitation and eventually extinction of the Volga
Germans. After Catherine’s rule, Russians made attempts to be rid of the Volga Germans,
as they were viewed as the enemies within. Russification efforts went into effect with the
1871 Codex, as the Russians began to resent the foreign Germans for how successful they
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had become when the Russians could not reap success from their own land. Tension grew
with animosity between the Volga Germans and Russians, and the animosity finally took
major action in 1914 with the onset of World War I. The Russians now had an “excuse”
to hate the Germans, and used the war as a justification for discriminatory and
xenophobic anti-German actions. The Germans were stripped not only of their rights
within Russia, but also of the German culture that they had taken with them. AntiGerman Russians engaged in witch-hunts to search for and be rid of any German they
could find, leading to a nationwide attempt at ethnic cleansing. The 1917 Revolution only
worsened this, as the Volga Germans were seen as a potential threat to the rising
Bolshevik state. Leading the Bolshevik Party, Vladimir Lenin used the Volga Germans’
success against them and demanded that they supply large quantities of their resources to
the rest of Russia. These harsh requisitions led to small-scale famine, which eventually
transformed into a nationwide famine in 1921. Hundreds of thousands of Volga Germans
were killed either by starvation during the famine, or at the hands of Russian soldiers for
“noncompliance”.
Over the course of these events within a 7-year period, the Volga Germans faced
discrimination, murder, starvation, and exploitation at the hands of the Russians.
Together, World War I, the 1917 Revolution, and the 1921 Famine collectively eroded
the condition of the Volga Germans, and left them weakened and barely existing by 1923.
Right when the situation started to look up after Lenin in 1924, a heavy hand was struck
upon them by Joseph Stalin, which caused destruction more extreme than everything they
had faced previously. By the time that Stalin struck with his iron fist, however, the Volga
Germans were still rendered defenseless from the period of 1914-1922, and were
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removed from Russia either by mass emigration or death. By 1939, the Volga German
population had shrunk from approximately 1.8 million to 392,000 and the Autonomous
Republic of Volga Germans was destroyed. By 1941, the remaining Volga Germans were
commanded to leave Russia or face death, and historians have called for the Soviet
Union’s actions to be investigated as genocide.
In the decades following these brutal witch-hunts and forced emigration, the
relationship between Volga Germans who had fled Russia and the Russians became
awkward, as the Russian government later attempted to amend the wrongdoings by
inviting Germans to return. However, due to further political limitations, very few did
and it is expected that in 1998, only 17,000 individuals with Volga German heritage
resided in Russia.41
The horrors from the Volga German experience speak to a larger issue of the
brutality occurring within Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as immigration narratives.
The Volga Germans were not the last group to be exposed to such extreme xenophobia
and hatred, as the Ukrainians shared a similar experience in the 1930s. The Ukrainian
experience has been investigated as genocide, and due to its striking similarity to the
treatment of the Volga Germans, has led to recent calls for the Volga German story to be
told as one of genocide as well.
The story of the Volga Germans has received very little attention by historians or
general society. It is very important, however, to understand the tragic story of these
immigrants, who trustingly travelled to an unknown land to make better lives for
themselves. The Volga Germans contributed greatly to the Russian economy and general
society, and generally abided by the rules imposed upon them. However, due to cultural
41
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differences, they were also outcasts in the very society to which they contributed so
much. The Volga Germans were the primary supplier of resources to the Russian people,
yet the Russians returned the favor with anti-German witch-hunts and eventually their
extermination. Because of the destruction of many primary source items from the Volga
Germans, it is up to their descendants to tell their ancestors’ devastating story, and to
understand this failed immigration experiment in the larger context of history in a world
where immigration and culture are still at the forefront.
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A map of the original Volga colonies. The Saratov Province, where the majority of the Germans settled,
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A 1919 German, anti-Bolshevik propaganda poster displaying a family watching in grief as their barn is
raided by Russian troops. It translates: “Need, Misery, Hunger, Suffering brings Bolshevism-that’s why
you all should stop Bolshevism from practicing far.” Fig. #2, Unknown Author, “Not ,Elend, Hunger,
Zerstörung bringt der Bolschewismus” Propaganda Poster, Heymann & Schmidt, Berlin, 1919.

30

A map displaying the devastation during the 1921 Famine; the darker the color, the move devastation.
Fig. #3, Save The Children Fund, The Russian Famine: Appalling Disaster, Millions of Children
Doomed, Great Crusade of Rescue, map, 1921.
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Fig. 4, Photographer Unknown, “Line of the Starving to the Dining Hall-Baronsk,” (1921), Photograph,
from Saratov Museum of Regional Studies, donated to The Historical Society of Germans From Russia
by John and Sue Groh.
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Fig. 5, photograph of a requisitioning brigade after collecting resources, 1919. Soviet Photography
1917-1940: The New Photojournalism, as cited in Orlando Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War.
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Fig. 6, map of battle strategies during the Peasant Wars. As found in Oscar Figes’ Peasant Russia, Civil
War, p. 323.
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